Monthly Archives: February 2011
Diplomatic Scramble as Ally Is Pushed to the Exit
By, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/02/world/middleeast/02transition.html?emc=na
Diplomatic Scramble as Ally Is Pushed to the Exit
Ed Ou for The New York Times
An effigy of President Hosni Mubarak hung from a traffic light in Tahrir Square in Cairo on Tuesday.
By MARK LANDLER, HELENE COOPER and DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK
Published: February 1, 2011
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WASHINGTON — Last Sunday at 2 p.m., a blue-and-white Air Force jet left Andrews Air Force Base bound for Cairo. On board was Frank G. Wisner, an adroit ex-diplomat whom President Obama had asked hours before to undertake a supremely delicate mission: nudging President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt out of power.
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Multimedia
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The Takeaway: David Sanger Discussing Diplomatic Options
The Takeaway: David Sanger Discussing Diplomatic Options//
Photographs 
Interactive Feature Related
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Obama Urges Faster Shift of Power in Egypt (February 2, 2011)
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Quiet Acts of Protest on a Noisy Day (February 2, 2011)
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King of Jordan Dismisses His Cabinet (February 2, 2011)
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Antiquities Chief Says Sites Are Largely Secure (February 2, 2011)
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New Service Lets Voices From Egypt Be Heard (February 2, 2011)
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Obama Urges Quick Transition in Egypt (February 2, 2011)
Related in Opinion
Friedman: B.E., Before Egypt. A.E., After Egypt. (February 2, 2011)
Dowd: Bye Bye, Mubarak (February 2, 2011)
Editorial: Beyond Mubarak (February 2, 2011)
Op-Ed Contributor: Israel, Alone Again? (February 2, 2011)
Room for Debate: Mubarak’s Role and Mideast Peace
Egypt TV, via Associated Press
President Hosni Mubarak announced on Egyptian state television that he would not run for a new term in September elections.
What exactly Mr. Wisner would say was still in flux as he flew to Egypt, administration officials said Tuesday; he talked with senior officials in Washington several times during the nearly 14-hour flight. By the time Mr. Wisner met with the Egyptian leader on Tuesday, the diplomat knew what message he would deliver. And Mr. Mubarak had already lost the backing of his other crucial pillar of support: the Egyptian military, which declared it would not open fire on the demonstrators who were demanding his ouster.
The story of how Mr. Mubarak, an Arab autocrat who only last month was the mainstay of America’s policy in a turbulent region, suddenly found himself pushed toward the exit is first and foremost a tale of the Arab street.
But it is also one of political calculations, in Cairo and Washington, which were upset repeatedly as the crowds swelled. And it is the story of a furious scramble by the Obama White House — right up until Mr. Obama’s call Tuesday night for change to begin “now” — to catch up with a democracy movement unfolding so rapidly that Washington came close to being left behind.
“Every time the administration uttered something, its words were immediately overtaken by events on the ground,” said Robert Malley, Middle East and North Africa program director for the International Crisis Group. “And in a matter of days, every assumption about the United States relationship with Egypt was upended.”
In Cairo, the protests prompted Mr. Mubarak to surround himself even more closely with current and former military leaders, including his new, hastily named vice president, prime minister and deputy prime minister.
But instead of protecting him, there is increasing evidence that over the last three days the military establishment — one of the most respected institutions in Egyptian society, and the crucial factor in deciding control of the streets — may have been moving toward pushing Mr. Mubarak out.
The first sign of the military’s deteriorating support came Saturday when rank-and-file troops ordered to buttress the retreating police instead began to cheer on the protesters. Then on Monday night, the military leadership appeared to break away, announcing that the military respected the people’s legitimate demands and that it would not use force against peaceful demonstrators.
A short time later, Mr. Mubarak’s closest aide, Omar Suleiman, the chief of Egyptian intelligence and the newly named vice president, invited opposition groups to negotiate over constitutional reforms.
Back in Washington, the administration was struggling to balance its ties to Mr. Mubarak, its most stalwart ally in the Arab world, with its fear of ending up on the wrong side of history.
But days of watching the protests mushroom on the streets of Egyptian cities convinced administration officials — some facing their first national security crisis in these roles — that Mr. Mubarak probably would not weather the political storm.
Former President George Bush, whose ties to Mr. Mubarak were cemented by the Egyptian leader’s commitment to supply Arab troops during the Persian Gulf war in 1991, called Mr. Mubarak, on his own initiative, to discuss the crisis, officials said. It was not clear what Mr. Bush told Mr. Mubarak.
At a two-hour meeting at the White House last Saturday, Thomas E. Donilon, the national security adviser; William M. Daley, the White House chief of staff, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Leon E. Panetta; and other officials coalesced around a strategy to start trying to ease Mr. Mubarak out, an official said.
Mrs. Clinton, officials said, suggested that the administration send Mr. Wisner, a former ambassador to Egypt who knows Mr. Mubarak well, to deliver a message directly from Mr. Obama to the Egyptian leader. Officials said Mr. Wisner urged Mr. Mubarak to declare publicly that he would not run for re-election. But Mr. Wisner has extended his stay in Cairo, officials said, and may have a follow-up meeting with Mr. Mubarak if events seem to demand a quicker exit.
At the Saturday meeting, the officials also agreed that Mrs. Clinton would start calling for “an orderly transition” when she taped a round of interviews for the Sunday talk programs. Administration officials were already smarting from not coming out more fully in support of the protesters earlier. In particular, Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. had been criticized for an interview with “NewsHour” on PBS on Thursday, in which he answered “no” when the host, Jim Lehrer, asked if the time had come for Mr. Mubarak to go.
“They took a little while to catch up, but by Sunday morning they understood that it was over, and since then, they’ve understood how to make it happen,” said Martin S. Indyk, the director of foreign policy at the Brookings Institution.
Still, administration officials were grappling with their public message versus their private message. Senior officials say that as Mr. Wisner traveled to Egypt, Obama officials in Washington were working on his message to Mr. Mubarak: to announce that he would not run for re-election (he did that), and to promise that his son would not run for election (he did not do that).
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Mark Landler and Helene Cooper reported from Washington, and David D. Kirkpatrick from Cairo.
A version of this article appeared in print on February 2, 2011, on page A1 of the New York edition.
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Jordan’s King Dismisses Cabinet After Protests
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published: February 1, 2011
Filed at 1:12 p.m. EST
AMMAN, Jordan (AP) — Jordan’s King Abdullah II, bowing to public pressure, fired his government on Tuesday and tasked a new prime minister with quickly boosting economic opportunities and giving Jordanians a greater say in politics.
The country’s powerful Muslim opposition, which had demanded the dismissal of Prime Minister Samir Rifai in several nationwide protests inspired by those in Tunisia and Egypt, said the changes didn’t go far enough.
Rifai, 45, who has been widely blamed for a rise in fuel and food prices and slow-moving political reforms, tendered his resignation early Tuesday to the king, who accepted it immediately, a Royal Palace statement said.
Abdullah named Marouf al-Bakhit, 63, as Rifai’s replacement. Al-Bakhit, an ex-general who supports strong ties with the U.S. and Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel, previously served as prime minister from 2005-2007.
Abdullah ordered al-Bakhit to “undertake quick and tangible steps for real political reforms, which reflect our vision for comprehensive modernization and development in Jordan.”
“Economic reform is a necessity to provide a better life for our people,” the king said in the statement. “But we won’t be able to attain that without real political reforms, which must increase popular participation in the decision-making.”
Abdullah also demanded an “immediate revision of laws governing politics and public freedoms,” including legislation governing political parties, public meetings and elections.
Jordan’s most powerful opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood, dismissed the changes as cosmetic.
“We reject the new prime minister and we will continue our protests until our demands are met,” said Hamza Mansour, leader of the Islamic Action Front, the Brotherhood’s political arm.
Mansour repeated his call for constitutional amendments to curb the king’s power in naming prime ministers, arguing that the post should go to the elected leader of the parliamentary majority.
Jordan’s constitution gives the king the exclusive powers to appoint prime ministers, dismiss parliament and rule by decree.
“Unlike Egypt, we don’t want a regime change in Jordan and we recognize the Hashemites’ rule in Jordan,” he said, referring to Jordan’s ruling family. “But we want to see real political reforms introduced.”
When he ascended to the throne in 1999, King Abdullah vowed to press ahead with political reforms initiated by his late father, King Hussein. Those reforms paved the way for the first parliamentary election in 1989 after a 22-year gap, the revival of a multiparty system and the suspension of martial law, which had been in effect since the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.
But little has been done since then. Although laws were enacted to ensure greater press freedom, journalists are still routinely prosecuted for expressing their opinion or for comments considered slanderous of the king and the royal family.
Some gains been made in women’s rights, but many say they have not gone far enough. Abdullah has pressed for stiffer penalties for perpetrators of “honor killings,” but courts often hand down lenient sentences.
Still, Jordan’s human rights record is generally considered a notch above that of Tunisia and Egypt. Although some critics of the king are prosecuted, they frequently are pardoned and some are even rewarded with government posts.
It was not immediately clear when al-Bakhit will name his Cabinet.
A government official said al-Bakhit was consulting with lawmakers, opposition groups, unionists and civil society institutions on the makeup of his Cabinet.
The official, who is involved in the consultations, said al-Bakhit may name some opposition leaders in the new government. He declined to say whether al-Bakhit may approach the Muslim Brotherhood and insisted on anonymity because he is not allowed to brief the media.
Al-Bakhit is a moderate politician, who served as Jordan’s ambassador to Israel earlier this decade.
Like Abdullah, he supports close ties with Israel under a peace treaty signed in 1994 and strong relations with the United States, Jordan’s largest aid donor and longtime ally.
In 2005, Abdullah named al-Bakhit as his prime minister days after a triple bombing on Amman hotels claimed by the al-Qaida in Iraq leader, Jordanian-born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
During his 2005-2007 tenure, al-Bakhit — an ex-army major general and top intelligence adviser — was credited with maintaining security and stability following the attack, which killed 60 people and labeled as the worst in Jordan’s modern history.
UPR Submission Myanmar – 10th session – February 2011UPR Submission Myanmar – 10th session – February 2011
UPR Submission
Myanmar – 10th session – February 2011
http://www.altsean.org/Reports/UPRSubmission.php
Summary
- The Alternative Asean Network on Burma (ALTSEAN-Burma) and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) submission focuses on the Myanmar military regime’s use of forced labor, the forced recruitment of child soldiers, the forced displacement of civilian populations, and rape and sexual violence committed by members of the Tatmadaw (Armed Forces). These widespread and systematic abuses amounting to crimes against humanity and war crimes, as defined by Article 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute, have been documented by numerous UN mechanisms and Rapporteurs.
- In May 2008, Myanmar’ s ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) adopted the country’s new Constitution. The drafting and approval of this document was the culmination of a highly controlled and undemocratic process that stretched over 15 years. The Constitution will come into force when the newly elected members of Parliament will convene following the planned 2010 general elections, the first in 20 years.
- With the current Constitution, the SPDC ensured its own protection for prior crimes. The Article 445 of the Constitution provides that no legal action can be taken against SPDC members who officially carried out their duties “according to their responsibilities.” The Charter effectively provides the SPDC with blanket immunity for the gross violations of human rights, including crimes against humanity and war crimes that it has committed over the past decades.
- In March 2009, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar Professor Tomás Ojea Quintana stated that the ongoing human rights abuses in the country were “the result of a state policy.” Due to the junta’s lack of accountability for those abuses, the Special Rapporteur made the unprecedented recommendation that the UN consider establishing a Commission of Inquiry into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the SPDC, a requests that ALTSEAN-Burma and FIDH fully support.
Forced Labor
- Myanmar has ratified the International Labor Organization (ILO) Forced Labor Convention (Convention 29). SPDC Order 1/99 officially outlawed forced labor in the country. In addition, Article 359 of the 2008 Constitution “prohibits forced labor.”
- Despite its international and domestic legal obligations, the SPDC has engaged in widespread and systematic forced labor abuses. The ILO has periodically discussed and documented Myanmar’s military regime’s pervasive forced labor violations.
- While every Myanmar citizen is at risk of being subjected to forced labor, the SPDC has particularly targeted civilian populations in ethnic minority areas. Civilians are forced to serve as military porters, act as land-mine detectors/sweepers, and work on the construction of roads, railroads, bridges, fences, and military barracks with little or no pay.
- Energy and infrastructure projects in such areas have also fueled forced labor practices. Forced labor has been associated with the building of the Yadana and Yetagun gas pipelines in Southern Mon State and Tenasserim Division and it continues to be used in connection with the construction of the Akyab-Kunming gas pipeline project in Arakan State. Forced labor involving sentry/patrol duty has also been reported along the Kanbauk-Myaingkalay gas pipeline in Southern Mon State.
- Reporting such practices has resulted in the persecution, arrest, and the imprisonment of complainants. In November 2003, activists Aye Myint, Shwe Mann, and Min Kyi were convicted of high treason and sentenced to death for filing forced labor reports with the ILO. In October 2005, activist Su Su Nway was sentenced to 18 months in jail after she successfully brought charges against local regime officials for forced labor practices. In November 2005, nine individuals received prison sentences ranging from 8 to 25 years because they contacted the ILO regarding forced labor issues. In September 2008, activist Thet Wei was sentenced to two years in prison with hard labor for possessing documents on SPDC ordered forced labor incidents.
- While ILO pressure and intervention has led to the release of some of the imprisoned activists, many other complainants remain under detention. In addition, the SPDC has continued to subject complainants to judicial retaliation, including the filing of criminal charges.
- In 2007, the SPDC signed an agreement with the ILO on the reporting and processing of forced labor complaints. In February 2010, the ILO and SPDC renewed the agreement for the third time. Despite official commitments by the SPDC to eradicate such practices, reports of the regime’s use of forced labor have continued to surface. According to a 2009 report by the ILO Liaison Officer in Rangoon, there were 71 forced labor complaints filed from 16 May to 28 October 2009, a 129% increase from the same period in 2008.
- Recommendations to the Government:
- Fulfill its obligations as a State party to the Forced Labor Convention 1930 (No. 29) and to the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87) of the ILO;
- Implement the ILO’s recommendations to cease Forced Labor and implement labor reforms; and
- Investigate and prosecute offences for forced labor committed by government agents in all circumstances.
Recruitment of child soldiers
- Myanmar has ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which prohibits military recruitment of children aged under 15 years. In addition, Myanmar has signed, but not yet ratified, the Optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which raised the minimum age to 18. Myanmar’s ‘Regulation for the Persons Subject to the Defense Services Act’ establishes the minimum age at 18 for the recruitment into Myanmar’s armed forces.
- Despite the regime’s laws and pledge to respect the UN Treaty, it is estimated that the Army has approximately 70,000 child soldiers, the largest number in the world. With almost 400,000 soldiers, nearly one in five soldiers in the Myanmar Army is under the age of 18. The military recruits boys as young as 12 years old. The military targets children in order to meet unrelenting demands for new recruits due to continued army expansion, high desertion rates, and a lack of volunteers.
- In 2004, the SPDC established the High-Level Committee for the Prevention of Military Recruitment of Under-age Children. In 2007, a working group for the monitoring and reporting mechanism on the prevention of military recruitment of underage children was established. However, these bodies have clearly failed to tackle efficiently the recruitment of child soldiers. Recent UN reports on child soldiers have showed that the SPDC has not met its obligations under international and domestic law to end child recruitment in its military.
- The November 2007 Report of the UN Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Myanmar confirmed the SPDC’s failure to eliminate the continued recruitment of child soldiers. The 2010 Annual Report of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict lists the Myanmar military as one of the actors that have recruited or used child soldiers for at least the past five years.
- The ILO said it received 80 child soldier cases in Myanmar in 2009. Between January and May 2010, it had already received 70 child soldier cases. Reports in June 2010 indicate that the number of incidents is increasing. The ILO said that the measures taken by the SPDC to address child recruitment remained “totally inadequate.”
- Recommendations to the Government:
- Release immediately all children present in its military ranks, and criminally prosecute those responsible of their recruitment; and
- Ratify without delay the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Forced Displacement
- Myanmar has one of the world’s worst displacement situations. Civilians have been the target of the SPDC’s ongoing campaign to fight ethnic armed opposition groups, particularly in Eastern Myanmar. The junta forcibly relocates villagers from contested zones into the regime’s controlled areas as part of its so-called “Four Cuts” policy, which aims at undermining the armed opposition’s access to recruits, information, supplies, and finances.
- Since 1996, the military has destroyed or forcibly relocated over 3,500 villages in Eastern Myanmar which has caused at least 470,000 people to be displaced. However, the SPDC does not recognize the existence of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the authorities have consistently refused to grant international aid organizations access to IDP in conflict areas to carry out relief operations. Displaced persons face a heightened vulnerability to disease and ill-health, violence, trafficking, forced labor, and reduced access to health services, education, and employment.
- Since 1998, 11 UN General Assembly resolutions and 9 UN Commission on Human Rights/UN Human Rights Council resolutions have called on the SPDC to end the forced displacement of persons.
- Exploitation of natural resources and the implementation of hydro-power projects have also contributed to the forced displacement of civilians in ethnic areas. Dam projects have already displaced tens of thousands villagers in Myanmar’s Kachin, Shan, Karenni, and Karen States. In most cases, displaced villagers have received little or no compensation.
- Recommendations to the Government:
- Implement recommendations formulated by relevant United Nations’ bodies, notably the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, urging the Government to ensure the protection of civilians and to stop without any delay the displacement of villagers.
Rape and sexual violence
- Myanmar is a party to the 4th Geneva Convention, which prohibits the waging of war against civilian populations, including using rape as a weapon of war. Myanmar has ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). However, it has not ratified the Optional Protocol, which allows the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women to hear complaints from individuals or inquire into “grave or systematic violations” of women’s rights. Myanmar domestic law also recognizes the rights of women and prohibits gender-based violence.
- The government’s structure is exclusively male. There are no women in ministerial or other key positions. A number of spouses of Myanmar leaders are considered to wield informal influence through government-sponsored groups such as the Myanmar Women’s Affairs Federation (MWAF). These groups participate in the CEDAW, but they repudiate the documentation of gender-based abuses as they specifically pertain to Myanmar.
- Every UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar has documented that the junta uses rape and sexual violence against women in ethnic areas, in full impunity and as part of a state policy aiming at the “Burmanization” and subjugation of ethnic areas.
- In 2008, CEDAW voiced its concern over the high prevalence of sexual and other forms of violence, including rape, perpetrated by Myanmar military against rural ethnic women, including Shan, Mon, Karen, Palaung, and Chin. The Committee also expressed concern that the trafficking and sexual exploitation of women and girls in Myanmar had continued unabated.
- In response to the concerns of the international community and to the numerous reports, the authorities told the CEDAW that violations against women are “investigated and prosecuted in accordance with the existing laws.” However, the CEDAW was not provided with any details on the magnitude of the problem of violence against women, or any legislative measures to combat this phenomenon.
- Recommendations to the Government:
- Implement all recommendations made by the Committee on CEDAW at its 42nd Session to the Government of Myanmar;
- Establish and enforce strict legislation criminalizing rape in every context, including by the military; and
- Put an end to the impunity of the perpetrators of sexual violence by investigating, prosecuting and punishing those responsible for rape and sexual violence.
UPR Submission Myanmar – 10th session – February 2011
http://www.altsean.org/Reports/UPRSubmission.php
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UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW (UPR) SUBMISSION ON BURMA |
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| The Alternative Asean Network on Burma (ALTSEAN-Burma) and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) submission focuses on the SPDC’s use of forced labor, the forced recruitment of child soldiers, the forced displacement of civilian populations, and rape and sexual violence committed by members of the Tatmadaw (Armed Forces).
These widespread and systematic abuses amounting to crimes against humanity and war crimes, as defined by Article 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute, have been documented by numerous UN mechanisms and Rapporteurs. |
UPR Submission
Myanmar – 10th session – February 2011
Summary
- The Alternative Asean Network on Burma (ALTSEAN-Burma) and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) submission focuses on the Myanmar military regime’s use of forced labor, the forced recruitment of child soldiers, the forced displacement of civilian populations, and rape and sexual violence committed by members of the Tatmadaw (Armed Forces). These widespread and systematic abuses amounting to crimes against humanity and war crimes, as defined by Article 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute, have been documented by numerous UN mechanisms and Rapporteurs.
- In May 2008, Myanmar’ s ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) adopted the country’s new Constitution. The drafting and approval of this document was the culmination of a highly controlled and undemocratic process that stretched over 15 years. The Constitution will come into force when the newly elected members of Parliament will convene following the planned 2010 general elections, the first in 20 years.
- With the current Constitution, the SPDC ensured its own protection for prior crimes. The Article 445 of the Constitution provides that no legal action can be taken against SPDC members who officially carried out their duties “according to their responsibilities.” The Charter effectively provides the SPDC with blanket immunity for the gross violations of human rights, including crimes against humanity and war crimes that it has committed over the past decades.
- In March 2009, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar Professor Tomás Ojea Quintana stated that the ongoing human rights abuses in the country were “the result of a state policy.” Due to the junta’s lack of accountability for those abuses, the Special Rapporteur made the unprecedented recommendation that the UN consider establishing a Commission of Inquiry into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the SPDC, a requests that ALTSEAN-Burma and FIDH fully support.
Forced Labor
- Myanmar has ratified the International Labor Organization (ILO) Forced Labor Convention (Convention 29). SPDC Order 1/99 officially outlawed forced labor in the country. In addition, Article 359 of the 2008 Constitution “prohibits forced labor.”
- Despite its international and domestic legal obligations, the SPDC has engaged in widespread and systematic forced labor abuses. The ILO has periodically discussed and documented Myanmar’s military regime’s pervasive forced labor violations.
- While every Myanmar citizen is at risk of being subjected to forced labor, the SPDC has particularly targeted civilian populations in ethnic minority areas. Civilians are forced to serve as military porters, act as land-mine detectors/sweepers, and work on the construction of roads, railroads, bridges, fences, and military barracks with little or no pay.
- Energy and infrastructure projects in such areas have also fueled forced labor practices. Forced labor has been associated with the building of the Yadana and Yetagun gas pipelines in Southern Mon State and Tenasserim Division and it continues to be used in connection with the construction of the Akyab-Kunming gas pipeline project in Arakan State. Forced labor involving sentry/patrol duty has also been reported along the Kanbauk-Myaingkalay gas pipeline in Southern Mon State.
- Reporting such practices has resulted in the persecution, arrest, and the imprisonment of complainants. In November 2003, activists Aye Myint, Shwe Mann, and Min Kyi were convicted of high treason and sentenced to death for filing forced labor reports with the ILO. In October 2005, activist Su Su Nway was sentenced to 18 months in jail after she successfully brought charges against local regime officials for forced labor practices. In November 2005, nine individuals received prison sentences ranging from 8 to 25 years because they contacted the ILO regarding forced labor issues. In September 2008, activist Thet Wei was sentenced to two years in prison with hard labor for possessing documents on SPDC ordered forced labor incidents.
- While ILO pressure and intervention has led to the release of some of the imprisoned activists, many other complainants remain under detention. In addition, the SPDC has continued to subject complainants to judicial retaliation, including the filing of criminal charges.
- In 2007, the SPDC signed an agreement with the ILO on the reporting and processing of forced labor complaints. In February 2010, the ILO and SPDC renewed the agreement for the third time. Despite official commitments by the SPDC to eradicate such practices, reports of the regime’s use of forced labor have continued to surface. According to a 2009 report by the ILO Liaison Officer in Rangoon, there were 71 forced labor complaints filed from 16 May to 28 October 2009, a 129% increase from the same period in 2008.
- Recommendations to the Government:
- Fulfill its obligations as a State party to the Forced Labor Convention 1930 (No. 29) and to the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87) of the ILO;
- Implement the ILO’s recommendations to cease Forced Labor and implement labor reforms; and
- Investigate and prosecute offences for forced labor committed by government agents in all circumstances.
Recruitment of child soldiers
- Myanmar has ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which prohibits military recruitment of children aged under 15 years. In addition, Myanmar has signed, but not yet ratified, the Optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which raised the minimum age to 18. Myanmar’s ‘Regulation for the Persons Subject to the Defense Services Act’ establishes the minimum age at 18 for the recruitment into Myanmar’s armed forces.
- Despite the regime’s laws and pledge to respect the UN Treaty, it is estimated that the Army has approximately 70,000 child soldiers, the largest number in the world. With almost 400,000 soldiers, nearly one in five soldiers in the Myanmar Army is under the age of 18. The military recruits boys as young as 12 years old. The military targets children in order to meet unrelenting demands for new recruits due to continued army expansion, high desertion rates, and a lack of volunteers.
- In 2004, the SPDC established the High-Level Committee for the Prevention of Military Recruitment of Under-age Children. In 2007, a working group for the monitoring and reporting mechanism on the prevention of military recruitment of underage children was established. However, these bodies have clearly failed to tackle efficiently the recruitment of child soldiers. Recent UN reports on child soldiers have showed that the SPDC has not met its obligations under international and domestic law to end child recruitment in its military.
- The November 2007 Report of the UN Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Myanmar confirmed the SPDC’s failure to eliminate the continued recruitment of child soldiers. The 2010 Annual Report of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict lists the Myanmar military as one of the actors that have recruited or used child soldiers for at least the past five years.
- The ILO said it received 80 child soldier cases in Myanmar in 2009. Between January and May 2010, it had already received 70 child soldier cases. Reports in June 2010 indicate that the number of incidents is increasing. The ILO said that the measures taken by the SPDC to address child recruitment remained “totally inadequate.”
- Recommendations to the Government:
- Release immediately all children present in its military ranks, and criminally prosecute those responsible of their recruitment; and
- Ratify without delay the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Forced Displacement
- Myanmar has one of the world’s worst displacement situations. Civilians have been the target of the SPDC’s ongoing campaign to fight ethnic armed opposition groups, particularly in Eastern Myanmar. The junta forcibly relocates villagers from contested zones into the regime’s controlled areas as part of its so-called “Four Cuts” policy, which aims at undermining the armed opposition’s access to recruits, information, supplies, and finances.
- Since 1996, the military has destroyed or forcibly relocated over 3,500 villages in Eastern Myanmar which has caused at least 470,000 people to be displaced. However, the SPDC does not recognize the existence of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the authorities have consistently refused to grant international aid organizations access to IDP in conflict areas to carry out relief operations. Displaced persons face a heightened vulnerability to disease and ill-health, violence, trafficking, forced labor, and reduced access to health services, education, and employment.
- Since 1998, 11 UN General Assembly resolutions and 9 UN Commission on Human Rights/UN Human Rights Council resolutions have called on the SPDC to end the forced displacement of persons.
- Exploitation of natural resources and the implementation of hydro-power projects have also contributed to the forced displacement of civilians in ethnic areas. Dam projects have already displaced tens of thousands villagers in Myanmar’s Kachin, Shan, Karenni, and Karen States. In most cases, displaced villagers have received little or no compensation.
- Recommendations to the Government:
- Implement recommendations formulated by relevant United Nations’ bodies, notably the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, urging the Government to ensure the protection of civilians and to stop without any delay the displacement of villagers.
Rape and sexual violence
- Myanmar is a party to the 4th Geneva Convention, which prohibits the waging of war against civilian populations, including using rape as a weapon of war. Myanmar has ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). However, it has not ratified the Optional Protocol, which allows the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women to hear complaints from individuals or inquire into “grave or systematic violations” of women’s rights. Myanmar domestic law also recognizes the rights of women and prohibits gender-based violence.
- The government’s structure is exclusively male. There are no women in ministerial or other key positions. A number of spouses of Myanmar leaders are considered to wield informal influence through government-sponsored groups such as the Myanmar Women’s Affairs Federation (MWAF). These groups participate in the CEDAW, but they repudiate the documentation of gender-based abuses as they specifically pertain to Myanmar.
- Every UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar has documented that the junta uses rape and sexual violence against women in ethnic areas, in full impunity and as part of a state policy aiming at the “Burmanization” and subjugation of ethnic areas.
- In 2008, CEDAW voiced its concern over the high prevalence of sexual and other forms of violence, including rape, perpetrated by Myanmar military against rural ethnic women, including Shan, Mon, Karen, Palaung, and Chin. The Committee also expressed concern that the trafficking and sexual exploitation of women and girls in Myanmar had continued unabated.
- In response to the concerns of the international community and to the numerous reports, the authorities told the CEDAW that violations against women are “investigated and prosecuted in accordance with the existing laws.” However, the CEDAW was not provided with any details on the magnitude of the problem of violence against women, or any legislative measures to combat this phenomenon.
- Recommendations to the Government:
- Implement all recommendations made by the Committee on CEDAW at its 42nd Session to the Government of Myanmar;
- Establish and enforce strict legislation criminalizing rape in every context, including by the military; and
- Put an end to the impunity of the perpetrators of sexual violence by investigating, prosecuting and punishing those responsible for rape and sexual violence.
ALTSEAN-BURMA Alternative Asean Network on Burma campaigns, advocacy and capacity-building for human rights
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http://www.altsean.org/Store/StorePublications.php ALTSEAN-BURMA
Alternative Asean Network on Burma campaigns, advocacy and capacity-building for human rights |
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BURMA ISSUES & CONCERNS VOL. 6: THE 2010 GENERALS’ ELECTION
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BURMA ISSUES & CONCERNS VOL. 6: THE 2010 GENERALS’ ELECTION |
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On 31 January, Burma’s military regime convened a puppet Parliament amid a shroud of secrecy and repression that will likely cause more human suffering and instability in the country and the region. The Parliament is the outcome of an oppressive constitution and an election marred with irregularities, intimidation, and fraud. Governments around the world criticized not only the election, but its related procedures and laws as well. These procedures and directives were designed to ensure that the electoral process would be neither free nor fair. The overwhelming ‘victory’ of the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party ensures that Burma’s first ‘civilian’ government in nearly 50 years will perpetuate the military regime’s failed policies. The report provides an incisive analysis of Burma’s 2010 elections and documents the extent to which the SPDC orchestrated and controlled every aspect of the election process. The report analyzes the conduct of the election process using key indicators based on commonly accepted standards for election monitoring (i.e. UN, OSCE, and EU guidelines) to demonstrate that the polls were not free and fair. |
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2011 UNHCR country operations profile – Malaysia Working environment
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e4884c6
2011 UNHCR country operations profile – Malaysia
Working environment
The context
Malaysia hosts some 90,000 refugees and asylum-seekers, of whom 92 per cent are from Myanmar. Other significant refugee populations in the country originate from Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Sri Lanka. The number of refugees and asylum-seekers has doubled since the end of 2008 as a result of large-scale registration of asylum-seekers, many of whom had been in the country for years.
Malaysia is not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its Protocol. There is currently no legislative or administrative framework for dealing with refugees. This challenging protection environment makes it difficult for UNHCR to fulfil its mandate in the country, which has some 3 million migrants, 1.5 million of whom are considered undocumented migrants.
By law, refugees are not differentiated from undocumented migrants. They are therefore vulnerable to arrest for immigration offences and may be subject to detention, prosecution, whipping and deportation. In the absence of a national administrative framework, UNHCR conducts all activities related to the reception, registration, documentation and status determination of asylum-seekers and refugees. Since refugees and asylum-seekers have no access to sustainable livelihoods or formal education, UNHCR runs a limited number of humanitarian support programmes for them, in cooperation with NGO partners.
Malaysia also hosts a population of some 60,000 Filipino Muslims in the province of Sabah for whom the Malaysian Government has assumed responsibility, and an estimated 40,000 potentially stateless people in Peninsular Malaysia.
The needs
With the protection environment unlikely to change significantly in the short to medium term, UNHCR will continue to advocate for the Government to make policy changes relating to refugees. An additional priority will be to strengthen public awareness of asylum issues in order to expand the humanitarian space for refugees, asylum-seekers and stateless people in Malaysia.
UNHCR will enhance its interventions to ensure that asylum-seekers and refugees are not subject to arrest, detention, deportation or . In the absence of the Government’s involvement in refugee processes, UNHCR will undertake to register asylum-seekers, determine their status claims and provide them with documentation.
Similarly, UNHCR will make efforts to address the basic needs of refugees in terms of livelihoods, health care, education and community development, ideally through community participation, self-management and self-reliance. This will remain a challenge, as refugees in Malaysia are of diverse nationalities and ethnic backgrounds, and are widely dispersed in urban areas as well as remote locations.
The main refugee groups in Malaysia originate from Afghanistan, Iraq, Myanmar and Somalia, where current conditions are not conducive to return. A sizeable group of refugees from Sri Lanka also live in Malaysia. In their case, however, improving conditions in Sri Lanka could present the potential for safe return. Local integration is not considered a viable option by the Malaysian authorities for the majority of refugees. For them, given the lack of prospects for return or local integration, resettlement remains the only option.
| 2011 UNHCR planning figures for Malaysia | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TYPE OF POPULATION | ORIGIN | JAN 2011 | DEC 2011 | ||
| TOTAL IN COUNTRY | OF WHOM ASSISTED BY UNHCR |
TOTAL IN COUNTRY | OF WHOM ASSISTED BY UNHCR |
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| Total | 197,800 | 91,500 | 201,300 | 95,000 | |
| Refugees | Myanmar | 73,000 | 73,000 | 78,000 | 78,000 |
| Various | 4,500 | 4,500 | 5,000 | 5,000 | |
| Asylum-seekers | Myanmar | 12,000 | 12,000 | 10,000 | 10,000 |
| Various | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | |
| Stateless | Stateless | 40,000 | 0 | 40,000 | 0 |
| Others of concern | Myanmar | 5,000 | 0 | 5,000 | 0 |
| Philippines | 61,300 | 0 | 61,300 | 0 | |
Main objectives and targets
Favourable protection environment
Mobilize the Government and civil society to address the problem of statelessness in Malaysia.
- Advocacy is conducted with key government counterparts to develop a legal and administrative framework to deal with statelessness.
Fair protection processes
Ensure that asylum-seekers and refugees are protected against refoulement, unwarranted detention and all forms of violence and abuse, including sexual and gender-based violence, and have access to a fair and efficient registration and refugee status determination (RSD) procedures.
Foster the development and implementation of a legal and administrative framework which provides a basic set of rights for asylum-seekers and refugees.
- Refugees and asylum-seekers enjoy timely registration and fair and efficient RSD procedures and receive UNHCR identity documentation.
- Legal counsel is provided to 500 asylum-seekers and refugees charged with immigration offences in court.
- Best Interest Determination (BID) procedures are applied in the case of 2,000 unaccompanied minors.
Basic needs and services
Improve or maintain the health of the population of concern.
- Basic and general medical care is provided for over 90,000 persons of concern nationwide.
Reduce risks of HIV and AIDS, and improve the quality of response.
- Community health education is provided for 81,000 persons.
Ensure optimal access to education for the population of concern.
- Alternative non-formal education or skills training is provided for 3,800 adolescent youth.
- At least 3,000 children of primary-school age are able to access learning opportunities.
Community participation and self-management
Develop and deliver programmes which support refugee communities and enable more self-help initiatives, while focusing on those with specific needs, particularly women and children.
- Enhanced support programmes and targeted interventions help 30,000 women and children.
Durable solutions
Develop and implement a comprehensive durable solutions strategy for people of concern in Malaysia, in cooperation with all stakeholders, including the Malaysian Government and the international community.
- Resettlement referrals are made for 15,000 refugees determined to be in need of this durable solution.
Strategy and activities in 2011
With no foreseeable shift in the level of Government engagement, UNHCR will continue to implement its international mandate to protect and assist refugees while seeking durable solutions for them. It will sustain and strengthen its dialogue with the Malaysian Government partners to capitalize on opportunities to foster a better understanding of the refugee situation, emphasize the need for coordination between the various ministries, and seek better treatment for asylum-seekers, refugees and stateless people.
UNHCR will continue to advocate through domestic and regional forums for government officials and stakeholders to redress the lack of national legal or administrative provisions for refugees. It will also try to distinguish refugees from irregular migrants in the public’s view.
The Office will build capacity in refugee communities through participatory assessments, joint planning with refugee community leaders and programmes in education, health, livelihoods and community development. It will also increase its capacity to offer fair and efficient protection processes to people of concern.
Constraints
Planning for 2011 is based on the assumption that the overall protection environment will not change significantly. The Malaysian Government is not expected to take significant steps to establish a legal and administrative framework for refugees. It is assumed that Malaysia will continue to see a steady flow of newly arriving asylum-seekers.
The Office will need to maintain a resource-intensive operation in terms of staffing in order to handle the registration and RSD of a significant number of new applicants, while also seeking durable solutions, particularly resettlement, for between 10,000 and 15,000 refugees. As the Government is likely to maintain its immigration policy, frequent immigration raids are expected to continue. Protection interventions will be required to secure the release from detention of approximately 1,000 persons of concern per year.
While UNHCR will continue to implement its livelihood and self-reliance strategies for people of concern, it is assumed that a sizeable portion of the refugee population will find their own coping mechanisms through employment in the informal labour market and community support. However, basic public services such as health, education and civil status documentation will remain limited due to Government policies, particularly for those who do not possess UNHCR identity cards.
Organization and implementation
Coordination
UNHCR’s close coordination with a range of stakeholders, including the Government, civil society, NGOs and UN agencies, is a key element in its country strategy. The Office will continue to strengthen coordination with civil-society actors, employers and academics, as well as liaise with international human-rights groups on issues of concern. Ongoing engagement with other UN agencies, notably UNICEF, will focus on issues relating to health and refugee children.
Financial information
The 2010-2011 budgets reflect the comprehensive needs of the populations of concern in Malaysia, while taking into account implementation capacity. They represent a significant increase over the budgets in 2008 and 2009, in order to respond to the increase in the population of concern as a result of large-scale registration of previously unregistered asylum-seekers. In 2011, the budget will have increased by over USD 2 million from 2010. Additional resources will be required to reinforce programmes in education, health, community self-reliance and livelihoods support.
Source: UNHCR Global Appeal 2011 Update
UNHCR airlifts aid to Côte d’Ivoire; internally displaced population nears 35,000
http://www.unhcr.org/4d52b5189.html
News Stories, 9 February 2011
© UNHCR/B.Kouame
Cote DÍvoire / IDPs / Displaced families on the site of a catholic mission in Duekoue. Some 35,000 people are displaced in the western part of Cote d Ivoire. UNHCR/ B. Kouame
ABIDJAN, Côte d’Ivoire, February 9 (UNHCR) – The UN refugee agency has flown in 94 tonnes of aid to Côte d’Ivoire for distribution among almost 35,000 internally displaced people in remote western areas of the country.
A UNHCR-chartered Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 747 cargo plane carrying 2,450 tents touched down at Abidjan’s international airport on Tuesday night after leaving Liege in Belgium earlier in the day. The tents will provide shelter for more than 12,000 internally displaced people (IDP).
It was the first airlift of UNHCR aid to the Ivorian capital for those displaced by the political crisis that followed November’s presidential election. More than 30,000 people have since fled to neighbouring Liberia, while UNHCR staff and partner organizations had registered more than 34,800 IDPs in western Côte d’Ivoire as of Tuesday. Most are women and children.
A UNHCR road convoy carrying a further 93 tonnes of aid, including 15,000 blankets, 10,000 sleeping mats, 10,000 jerry cans, 5,000 kitchen sets, mosquito nets and plastic sheeting, was due to leave Accra in neighbouring Ghana on Wednesday and arrive in Côte d’Ivoire on Thursday or Friday.
Most of the IDPs in the west are located in Duékoué district, where some 22,000 people are being hosted in schools, churches, spontaneous settlements or with local communities in surrounding villages. UNHCR is negotiating with the local authorities to establish a temporary camp site for the most vulnerable among the displaced. Other groups of IDPs are also present in Man, Danané, Binhouye, Zouhanhouin and Guiglo districts.
The aid from the airlift and the road convoy will initially be kept at a UNHCR warehouse in the north of Abidjan. Getting supplies to the internally displaced people in the west will be a logistical and security challenge in tough terrain at a time when the race is on to meet shelter and other needs.
“The volatile security situation in Côte d’Ivoire, and specifically in the west of the country, is impeding our humanitarian activities. We need to always keep the security aspect in mind,” said Jacques Franquin, UNHCR’s representative in Côte d’Ivoire, while adding: “The goal of our staff is to assist people in need as soon as possible.”
Franquin said the establishment of the camp in Duékoué district would provide shelter and assistance to the most vulnerable, many of whom are staying in the open. “Many houses were damaged or destroyed during ethnic and political confrontations in early January, so the long-term goal is to put in place a reconstruction programme,” he said.
“UNHCR and other agencies in the west plan to establish a social cohesion programme in order to create the conditions for people to be able to return to a home and develop reintegration and reconciliation activities,” he added.
The registration exercise completed yesterday by UNHCR, the UN Population Fund and International Organization for Migration, will help the UN refugee agency organize adequate assistance.
Cote d’Ivoire is also hosting some 26,000 Liberian refugees, some of whom say they feel at risk amid the volatile political situation.
By Hélène Caux in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire
Refugees watch Iraqi elections with doubts and hopes
http://www.unhcr.org/4b8bcfb36.html
News Stories, 1 March 2010
© UNHCR/J.Wreford
Iraqi refugees attend a language class in Damascus. They will be following next weekend’s elections in Iraq keenly.
BEIRUT, Lebanon, March 1 (UNHCR) – Like many Iraqi refugees forced from their homeland by war and sectarian conflict, Murtada hopes parliamentary elections on March 7 will restore security to Iraq to facilitate the safe return of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis living in host countries across the Middle East.
Iraqi refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt are divided on whether to participate in Iraq’s coming parliamentarian elections. Many Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR are sceptical the polls will end the abductions, killings and suicide bombings that drove them out of their country.
Many prefer either to remain in the host countries or seek resettlement to third countries. Return to Iraq under insecure and unstable conditions is not an option for many Iraqi refugees.
“If Iraq was safe, we would return today. Unfortunately the dangerous security situation has forced us to seek refuge outside Iraq. We are not optimistic the election will bring about security, but I’m hopeful my vote will make a difference and lead to change,” said Murtada, 26, an Iraqi refugee in Lebanon.
Threats and attacks made Murtada flee in 2004 to Lebanon, where he registered as a refugee at the UNHCR office in Beirut.
“I was losing hope of resettlement and faced harsh conditions without a residency permit in Lebanon, so I took the risk and returned to Iraq in 2009,” he said. “One week later I was abducted and beaten up, and a month later my wife was killed in a suicide bombing. I fled again and decided I would not return until Iraq was a secure place to live in.”
As the end of 2009, UNHCR had on its records some 300,000 Iraqis who had registered and are believed to still be in the region, including more than 210,000 in Syria. Close to 190,000 are of voting age. In addition, host government sources indicate the total number is much higher, as hundreds of thousands do not register with UNHCR for a variety of reasons.
So far about 35,000 Iraqi refugees have been resettled in the United States and Europe but it will never be a solution for everyone. Most of the refugees will continue waiting for conditions inside Iraq to improve so they can go home.
Following a request by the Iraqi Election Commission, UNHCR said it stands ready to help the participation of Iraqi refugees living in countries neighbouring Iraq in the elections. They are considered to be a major opportunity to consolidate national reconciliation.
“In close cooperation with the competent Iraqi authorities and the host governments, UNHCR’s assistance will be limited to providing demographic data on the registered Iraqis, informing them of their rights to participate in the elections, and providing logistical support that may be needed for a smooth and orderly election process,” UNHCR spokesperson Melissa Fleming told journalists in Geneva after the Iraqi request.
Iraq’s March election is a test of whether the country will move toward democratization and peace or slide back into ethnic and sectarian violence. Security remains fragile. Violence has been rising in parts of the country ahead of the election and as the United States plans to trim its troop presence in Iraq by the middle of this year.
“I will not take part in this election. Why should I vote and what I will get by voting? Nothing,” said Haidar, a 60-year-old Iraqi refugee living in Syria. Angry and tense, he was sceptical the election would lead to an improvement in the security situation in Iraq. “I don’t believe the election will help us return to Iraq. I will not return to Iraq under these insecure conditions,” he said.
Iraqi refugees in different countries cited sectarian violence as the greatest threat if they return. Despite often poor living conditions in host countries, they say going home was too dangerous.
Many people were traumatized in Iraq by their experiences and the violence that depived them of loved ones. UNHCR has provided mental and physical health assistance to many Iraqis through local partners.
During a meeting of a UNHCR community service officer with Iraqi refugees in a Beirut suburb, they discussed problems refugees face and how to resolve them. Protection through resettlement topped their requests, followed by concerns about economic security, education for their children and health care.
“We’re caught between a rock and a hard place,” said Nada, who has three children and a bed-ridden husband. She is unemployed and terrified of detention by authorities who might not distinguish between illegal migrants and refugees. “I will vote because I still have hope that one day security might be restored in Iraq.”
By Wafa Amr in Beirut, Lebanon
